Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN

Lebanon Deal Eases Tensions

Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN

18/07/2008

The Lebanese political settlement has eased tensions both domestically and in the wider Middle East, promoting movement on a number of diplomatic fronts while contributing to prospects for a potential regional realignment. 

With the makeup of Lebanese Premier Fuad Siniora's cabinet finally decided following weeks of wrangling, a ministerial committee met Thursday to formulate a limited government program, which, it is hoped, will carry the cobbled-together unity administration through to elections expected in spring 2009. 

Lebanon's 18-month political stalemate brought the consociational Lebanese governance system to the brink of collapse, ending in victory for the opposition in Qatar in May. 

Truce 
May's Doha agreement was a major diplomatic coup for the Qatari hosts, whose peripatetic foreign policy initiatives have reportedly caused considerable consternation in the US. 

The deal has also been rightly presented as a major blow to US and Saudi interests in Lebanon and to the allied majority 14 March coalition, which had held out for so long in the face of opposition demands for a veto over government decisions - which Hizbollah and allies enjoy in the new cabinet. 

Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the impact of the agreement on the alignment of international interests in Lebanon, which remains largely the same. 

"The Doha agreement was a truce, it did not provide for a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Lebanon […] it simply prevented the Lebanese system from totally collapsing," Dr Hilal Khashan from the American University of Beirut told ISN Security Watch in a telephone interview. 

Opposition predominance continued in the grinding coalition formation process, with Hizbollah ally Michel Aoun compensated for his failure to secure the presidency with prominent cabinet posts. In "the formation of the cabinet, the March 14 majority had to make unpleasant concessions," Khashan confirmed. 

The Qatari deal signaled the new-found pre-eminence of the pro-Syrian opposition, confirming the results of sharp armed clashes earlier in the month. It remains to be seen what the long-term impact of this rise in power will be given the fractured state of the Lebanese body politic and rapid warming of Franco-Syrian relations. 

Speaking to ISN Security Watch, the International Crisis Group's Peter Harling was hopeful: "I think the impact [of Doha] has been extremely significant. 

"Unless violence takes over again this conflict will now play out within the framework of Lebanon's institutions, in particular, through the parliamentary elections in 2009 rather than on the streets through armed conflict as was the trend increasingly in the past couple of years." 

Sealing de-escalation 
The Lebanese political deal has arguably played a significant role in facilitating German-mediated Hizbollah-Israeli negotiations on this week's prisoner exchange and Syrian-Israeli talks on the Golan. 

It was no accident that news of ongoing Turkish-mediated talks on the Golan was broken by the Syrians around the time of the Doha summit and that the worsening Lebanese political crisis coincided with the February assassination of Hizbollah military chief Imad Mughniyah in Damascus. 

Wednesday's prisoner and body swap on the Lebanese-Israeli border was presented by Hizbollah as a major victory. However, a more sober assessment reveals that the deal may in fact be good for both sides, bringing down the curtain on the July-August 2006 conflict and lessening the chances for a resumption in hostilities. 

Israel says it is no longer holding Lebanese prisoners. Hizbollah doubts this but, if demonstrated, this means that the primary motivation for Hizbollah cross-border kidnap operations no longer exists. Israel's June negotiations offer to Lebanon also eases tensions despite Beirut's rejection. 

It is no coincidence that Hizbollah's agreement to the prisoner/body swap, which reportedly saw the Shia movement drop its demand for the inclusion of a large number of Palestinian prisoners in the deal, was only achieved in the wake of the Doha agreement and coincided with the formation of the Lebanese unity government. 

Doha also allowed Israel, previously concerned with the impact of the exchange on the 14 March coalition, a freer hand in negotiations despite stated concerns regarding alleged UNIFIL (UN Mission in Lebanon) failures to curb Hizbollah activities in southern Lebanon. 

"Hizbollah's concerns now are domestic […] and Israel knows that," Khashan said, adding, "The release of the hostages and swap of the prisoners means that Israel does not want to focus on Hizbollah right now. Israel wants to focus on the Iranian nuclear project." 

"I don't think that the swap makes much of a difference because Hizbollah doesn't want to take the initiative of a new round of confrontation with Israel at this point," Harling said. 

Saudi quiescence 
Saudi Arabia's primary ally in Lebanon, Saad al-Hariri's Future Movement, was specifically targeted by Hizbollah in its May strikes and is under threat of being outflanked by Sunni Islamist movements, a Beirut analyst told ISN Security Watch recently. 

"The Syrian perspective on this is that there is a real conflict of interests between Syria and Saudi Arabia which is made worse by personal issues," Harling said. In a controversial televised August 2006 address Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called Arab leaders "half-men" for failing to support Hizbollah during the group's conflict with Israel war. 

"The Doha agreement is perceived by the Saudis as a defeat," Harling said, adding, "It doesn't think it makes the relations between the two countries [Syria/Saudi Arabia] any better." He added that Syria appeared to be seeking a normalization of relations with the Saudis but that the understanding in Damascus was that "this will be difficult and take time." 

Egypt has reportedly been seeking a mediating role between the Saudis and Syrians, with no ostensible signs of progress. 

Khashan believes that "Syria has been making an effort so that the moderate Arab states will rehabilitate Syria in the Arab world. Syria would not part from Iran if she did not expect to improve her relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt." 

Embracing Syria 
Last weekend's inaugural Mediterranean Union meeting in Paris constituted something of a coming out party for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after years of isolation. 

French President Nicolas Sarkozy has led moves to rapidly rehabilitate bilateral ties with Syria. France played a key role in failed mediation efforts between Lebanese factions. 

"The Doha agreement has had a very spectacular impact on French policy," Harling said. "The French have initiated a phase of all-out normalization with Syria." 

The French post-Doha reversal is significant as Paris suspended diplomatic ties with Damascus in late December at the height of the Lebanese political crisis, accusing Damascus of blocking the election of a new Lebanese president. 

"The French are dealing with the Syrians on the basis of a green light from the Americans otherwise they wouldn't have gone that far in communicating with the Syrians," Khashan said. 

French President Nicholas Sarkozy reportedly told Lebanese President Michel Suleiman in Paris that he had "placed bets on trusting Bashar [al-Assad]," but that ongoing French support for the normalization process was attendant on the Syrian leader delivering on his commitments. 

These commitments include the swapping of ambassadors and demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border, important symbolic moves of limited practical significance. 

Divorce? 
Iran, which has sought to tighten economic and diplomatic relations with Damascus in recent years, is increasingly showing signs of concern that Syria could be on the verge of shifting foreign policy positions in a manner that would damage Iranian regional interests. 

An advisor to Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei warned this weekthat "fundamental consequences and changes" would occur in bilateral Iranian-Syrian relations should it sign a peace deal with and recognize Israel. 

Khashan believes that "a divorce is underway between Iran and Hizbollah on one hand and the Syrians on the other. It is a quiet divorce and the two sides are keeping up appearances and claiming nothing is wrong. 

"Iran right now is trying to ensure that Hizbollah will continue to exist as a military force without using Syria as a conduit for supplying aid to Hizbollah," he said. 

Asked whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance was at risk, Harling said, "It is a very pragmatic relationship. It is not deeply ideological. […]. Iranian and Syrian interests are not identical in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Palestine, so tensions arise on a regular basis but I think that is part of the mode of this relationship. 

"The coordination between the two countries is deep enough for these tensions to be leveled out," he concluded. 

Awaiting Washington 
Syria hopes that the post-Doha French embrace and gradual warming of relations with other major European states will establish the basis for the resumption of ties with the US. 

Israel's decision to push ahead with Turkish-mediated talks on the future of the Golan Heights places pressure on Washington to relent and engage directly as Syria has made it clear that it will not agree to direct negotiations with Israel without direct US involvement. 

Al-Assad gave a clear message to both the US and Iran of his willingness to engage at the Paris talks and Bastille Day festivities. While avoiding direct interaction with Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert, he reportedly allowed messages to be passed via Turkish President Recep Erdogan and a photo-op on the Bastille Day podium with Olmert standing only meters away. 

A US-Syrian rapprochement is required to cement the gains made through the establishment of the Lebanese unity government but looks unlikely to occur ahead of the inauguration of a new US president next January; with Israeli political ructions also easing pressure for an immediate US policy shift. 

Harling argues that the US "focus is very much Iraq and Iran, and Syria is not seen by the current administration as anything more than a spoiler and an irritant. I don't think there is any appetite there for engagement and I don't think there is much time anyway to achieve anything." 

"Under the next administration, to me there is no doubt that […] engagement with Syria will take place, if only over Iraq," he said. 

"The Syrians want American approval and recognition," Khashan said. He believes that after the new US administration takes office and Syrian-Israeli talks pick up pace, "the Syrians will insist on US involvement and that will definitely come."