Emile Khoury From L'Orient Le Jour

Le Hezbollah a de bonnes raisons de voler au secours électoral de Aoun

Après avoir appuyé le scrutin en un jour, et en avoir permis le vote au Parlement, le général Michel Aoun et sayyed Hassan Nasrallah se ravisent et demandent que l'opération électorale se déroule en deux étapes ou même plus. Pourquoi ce revirement ?
Des loyalistes, s'appuyant sur des sondages d'opinion, répondent que Aoun, en perte de vitesse manifeste, a besoin de la machine électorale du Hezbollah, de son apport technique et logistique. Et qu'il souhaite donc qu'elle puisse se consacrer entièrement à l'aide qu'il en attend. Ce qui ne peut être le cas si le Hezb doit s'occuper en premier, le même jour, de ses propres circonscriptions. De plus, pour compenser les pertes de son précieux allié en pays chrétien, le parti du sayyed devrait le laisser choisir les candidats chrétiens dans les régions chiites, au Sud et dans la Békaa. Un manque à gagner important pour le Hezb comme pour Amal.

Ce mouvement, on le sait, refuse pour sa part que Aoun lui ravisse des strapontins à Jezzine ou au Zahrani. À Marjeyoun, c'est une autre formation du 8 Mars, le PSNS, qui a fait barrage au général Issam Abou Jamra, bras droit du général Aoun, pour maintenir Assaad Hardane au siège grec-orthodoxe. Le vice-président du Conseil a dû se résigner à se porter candidat à Beyrouth. Ce qui n'est pas sans inquiéter certains postulants aounistes qui craignent qu'ils ne soient également transférés dans des circonscriptions dont ils ne sont pas natifs.
Toujours est-il que, comme on le voit avec l'éclosion de permanences hezbollahies en pays chrétien, le CPL a quand même la chance que son allié chiite n'a pas d'inquiétude à se faire dans ses propres fiefs. Et n'a pas besoin d'y mobiliser toutes les ressources, tous les effectifs, de son instrument électoral. Il peut donc prêter son concours aux candidats aounistes qui risquent d'être en difficulté face à des rivaux Kataëb ou FL. Étant entendu que le gros de cette assistance consistera à faire voter massivement l'électorat chiite en faveur du CPL, au Mont-Liban et dans certaines régions du Liban-Nord. Tout en s'efforçant d'entraîner le Tachnag dans ce même sillage.
Ce n'est pas simplement par loyauté envers un fidèle allié que le Hezb se dévoue de la sorte, à Jbeil, au Kesrouan, au Metn, à Batroun ou au Koura. Mais parce qu'il est très important pour lui de continuer à disposer d'une couverture chrétienne pour son projet. Afin de réfuter tout reproche de visées plus confessionnelles que nationales.
Le rêve du Hezbollah reste de voir le 8 Mars, dont il est l'incontestable fer de lance, remporter les élections et décrocher le pouvoir exécutif. Si cela ne devait pas être le cas, et il s'y prépare manifestement, il devrait pouvoir imposer de nouveau un cabinet dit d'union avec tiers de blocage. Afin de contrôler suffisamment la scène locale pour négocier en position de force avec toute partie étrangère, occidentale ou arabe. Voire même, le cas échéant, avec les Syriens et avec les Iraniens. Notamment sur son armement, ou plutôt son désarmement, et sur l'application de la 1701. Et l'on sait qu'avec la détente extérieure en cours, ce sont ces deux points qui vont être réclamés à Damas comme à Téhéran.
Or pour maintenir, à tout le moins, le statu quo des rapports de force internes, il est nécessaire, pour le Hezb, que Aoun retourne au Parlement à la tête d'un bloc aussi consistant que celui qu'il dirige présentement.
Cependant, l'engagement du Hezbollah à ses côtés met le général Aoun plutôt en porte-à-faux au niveau de l'opinion chrétienne. Saisissant la balle au bond, des loyalistes se demandent comment le champion autoproclamé de la cause communautaire peut-il prétendre au titre de leader unique incontesté quand, pour espérer garder quelques strapontins, il se trouve obligé de faire appel au parti chiite. À l'aide de ses militants et à la collecte des voix chiites qu'il peut mobiliser, ou forcer à voter CPL, à Jbeil, à Baabda ou au Nord. En outre, soulignent ces majoritaires, l'aveu indirect de sa faiblesse populaire prouve que le général Aoun avait tort de soutenir que le retour à la loi électorale de 1960 favoriserait le rétablissement des droits politiques chrétiens.

Fady Noun From L'orient Le Jour

Aoun en Syrie : plus de vent que de pluie…

L'orient le Jour

11/12/2008

La tournée supermédiatisée de Michel Aoun en Syrie, terre de saint Maron et « berceau du christianisme », continue d’alimenter la chronique, l’opinion restant très partagée sur son opportunité, alors que le contentieux syro-libanais reste si lourdement chargé. Le fait que le chef du CPL ait rendu compte de sa tournée au chef de l’État a adouci quelque peu les réactions, dans la mesure où cette démarche laisse penser que Michel Aoun respecte malgré tout les institutions nationales. 
Toutefois, le Bloc national a réagi violemment à l’information selon laquelle un émissaire du général Aoun se rendrait incessamment à Bkerké pour informer le patriarche des résultats de sa visite, M. Carlos Eddé allant même jusqu’à demander au chef de l’Église maronite de ne pas le recevoir... Un geste improbable, en totale contradiction avec la tradition patriarcale maronite. 
Ce sont principalement les milieux chrétiens qui se sont offusqués de l’étalage médiatique de la visite en Syrie. Par contre, ce sont surtout les milieux sunnites qui ont réagi à l’idée d’un amendement de l’accord de Taëf lancée par Aoun à partir de Damas. 
La réaction la plus mesurée et la mieux argumentée est venue de l’ancien Premier ministre Nagib Mikati, qui a rappelé au chef du CPL qu’un amendement de ce type relève des questions consensuelles qui doivent faire l’unanimité des communautés libanaises, et qu’une majorité parlementaire, aussi large soit-elle, ne suffit pas à légitimer un amendement, surtout s’il concerne les prérogatives respectives des trois premières présidences. 
En tout état de cause, les observateurs estiment que, une fois retombé le côté sensationnel de la visite, la tournée du général Aoun en Syrie ne pourra faire ombrage ni à la présidence de la République ni au rôle de Bkerké. Du reste, l’échange d’ambassadeurs entre le Liban et la Syrie, sur le point de se concrétiser, marquera la suprématie des processus institutionnels. Notons aussi, sur ce plan, la visite de 24 heures que le chef de l’État effectuera, dimanche, en Jordanie. 
Côté international, la situation au Liban continue d’être suivie de près. À ce sujet, et à la veille de la reprise du dialogue national (22 décembre), on annonce que le président Nicolas Sarkozy est attendu au Liban le 5 décembre pour une visite de 24 heures. Selon une source diplomatique, citée par notre correspondant diplomatique, Khalil Fleyhane, cette visite illustre l’inquiétude que la France nourrit à l’égard d’un dialogue national en difficulté. 
Reçu par la secrétaire d’État Condoleezza Rice, à Washington, le ministre Nassib Lahoud, en tournée aux États-Unis, a cru comprendre, pour sa part, que l’évolution de la situation régionale ne se répercutera pas négativement sur le Liban. 
Enfin, l’actualité locale a été marquée, durant le long congé de l’Adha, par la visite de l’ancien président américain Jimmy Carter, dont l’association souhaite pouvoir suivre le bon déroulement des prochaines élections. Le ministre de l’Intérieur a démenti hier qu’une décision ait déjà été prise en ce sens, mais affirmé que son ministère poserait les critères qui qualifieraient toute association qui voudrait être présente sur le terrain, en juin prochain.

Sami Moubayed From Middle East Times

Lebanon's Aoun in a Syrian gambit

Middle East Times

04/12/2008

When I lived in Lebanon in the 1990s, the streets of what was once-called East Beirut were covered with graffiti saying "Aoun is coming back!" 

This referred to former army commander and prime minister Michel Aoun, who was ousted from Baabda Palace, the official residence of the president, by the Syrian army in 1990. Last year, the same streets were filled with colorful orange posters saying "Aoun for president". 
Aoun returned to Lebanon after 15 years in exile on May 7, 2005. The Syrian army had left a month before and Aoun had marketed himself as the man who led the ejection of Syria through United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which demanded an end to its decades-long occupation of Lebanon. 
He ran for parliament in 2005, won with a landslide victory, and ran for president in 2007, but was defeated by current President Michel Suleiman in a parliament vote in May this year. 
Aoun had returned to Lebanon on the offensive, hateful of everyone and everything that kept him in exile for so long, and promising destruction of the existing order and sweet revenge. The Beirut he returned to in 2005 was very different from the war-torn city he had left behind. 
It did not bear the hallmarks of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister assassinated in 2005, yet, all the actors of Beirut 1990 are still there and most of them have been more than troubled by his comeback. 
They were even more alarmed by the 73-year-old's groundbreaking five-day visit to Damascus, which started on December 3. It is purportedly to signal that "the general", as his supporters call him, has finally turned a new page with his former enemies in Damascus. 
At Beirut airport on his return on May 2005, Aoun told the masses, most of whom were too young to remember the civil war, that Lebanon would never be governed again by "political feudalism" and a "religious system that dates back to the 19th century". This, his first encounter with the press and well-wishers, was less than diplomatic, when annoyed with all the commotion the ex-general barked at those welcoming him, claiming they were noisy. 

He then called for an end to the "old fashioned prototypes which represent the old bourgeoisie which persists without any questioning", effectively a promise to strike back at Lebanon's entire political establishment. 
His appearance at Damascus Airport this week was very different, there he was seen smiling to the TV cameras, aware of the shock waves he was sending through the pro-West March 14 Coalition which was no doubt watching from Beirut. 
Aoun’s Syria trip is scheduled to include a visit to the "Street called Straight", the Roman street that runs from east to west in the heart of old Damascus; churches throughout the Syrian capital's Bab Touma neighborhood; and the Grand Umayyad Mosque that was visited by Pope John Paul II in 2001. 

He is also slated to speak to students at universities, and tour Christian villages in the countryside, where a grassroots welcome is awaiting him. Although officially only a party leader (the Free Patriotic Movement) and member of parliament, who commands the largest Christian bloc, he was welcomed at Damascus International Airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad, and had a high profile audience with President Bashar al-Assad on Wednesday. 

"We spoke with our hearts and minds ... so there remains no trace of a past in which there are many painful things," said Aoun after meeting Assad, in reference to his former "war of liberation" against Syria. "I left behind the past when I came to Syria," he noted. "We want to build the future, not dwell on the past." 
Aoun added, "What was once forbidden has now become halal - very halal," claiming that his visit turns a new page in Syrian-Lebanese relations. 

Before returning to Lebanon in 2005, Aoun had promised a "tsunami" in Lebanese politics. His appearance in Damascus on Wednesday goes some way to achieving that. The average age of his supporters when he returned was 20, young men and women who were easily enchanted by the fiery speeches Auon gave from exile in France. 
A generation hungry for reform and hope, they supported Aoun as an exiled leader. They rooted for him again in 2007 when he was running for president - a job he has coveted since 1988. But Aoun understood early on since his return that Christian support alone is no longer enough to govern Lebanon. The nation changed dramatically both during and after the civil war, and no president could be voted into power if he were not supported by the Shi'ite majority, which is loyal to Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah. 

Aoun last year made a pact with Nasrallah, pledging to support Hezbollah and its war against Israel, and to run as running mates for the elections in 2009. 

A long road for Aoun 
Aoun was born in 1935 to a poor family in Haret Hraik, a Shi'ite neighborhood that is currently a stronghold for Hezbollah. Aoun attended Catholic schools, lived with a religious family, but declared years later that he "never differentiated between Ali and Peter, or between Hasan and Michel". 
One of the first questions fired at him by a journalist on his return to Lebanon was whether he intended to visit his native neighborhood, which is swarming with Shi'ite warriors today, and meet with Nasrallah. He replied affirmatively, but this was long before he made his now famous pact with Hezbollah. 
Aoun finished high school in 1955, enrolled at the Military Academy and graduated in 1958, while a popular uprising was raging in Lebanon against then-president Camille Chamoun. Aoun watched attentively as the Lebanese army, which he was entering, remained loyal to its president. 

When Aoun was 40, his country descended into civil war, as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) of Yasser Arafat fought with the Muslims of Lebanon against the Maronite forces of Pierre Gemayel, who were backed by Syria. By the late 1970s, the Lebanese army had fractured along sectarian lines, yet Aoun, having learned from the 1958 experience, remained loyal to the central government. In the early 1980s, he became head of the "defense brigade" of the Lebanese army, a unit separating East and West Beirut. In 1982, he was involved in fighting against the Israeli army that occupied Beirut. 
That same year, Aoun created the 8th Brigade, which fought the Syrian army in the Souk al-Gharb pass overlooking Beirut. In June 1984, a reconciliation conference was held for all warring parties in Switzerland - brokered by Hariri - and army commander Ibrahim Tannous was fired and replaced by Aoun. 

Aoun complied, but took no part in politics, giving no press interviews between 1984 and 1988. In September 1988, 15 minutes before the end of his term, president Amin Gemayel appointed Aoun prime minister, breaching the National Pact of 1943, which said that a prime minister had to be a Muslim Sunni, and the president's office could be occupied exclusively by a Maronite Christian. 
Lebanon's Muslim prime minister, Salim al-Hoss, who had taken over after the assassination of prime minister Rashid Karameh, refused to step down, resulting in two Lebanese governments. Aoun's team reigned from Baabda Palace. 
When he came to power, Aoun only controlled limited areas of East Beirut.To establish himself as a cross-confessional leader, Aoun began his war on the Lebanese Forces (LF), a Maronite militia headed by Samir Gagegea, who is currently his main rival in the Lebanese Christian community. 
Aoun ordered 15,000 of his troops into action and wrestled the port of Beirut from the LF.He shelled entire neighborhoods of East Beirut and infuriated the Christians of Lebanon, who to date had kept East Beirut quiet and safe. On March 14, 1989, Aoun declared his "war of liberation" against Syria.
He even opened channels with Syria's arch enemies, such as Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and Arafat, who described him as a "sword of nationalism" in Lebanon. Aoun finally agreed to the ceasefire proposed by the Arab League in September 1989, but refused to endorse the Taif Accord of Saudi Arabia of October 1989, claiming it did not call for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. 
Aoun's "rebellion" ended rapidly when in August 1990, his friend Saddam invaded Kuwait. The United States, eager to defeat the Iraqi dictator, wanted Arab support in Operation Desert Storm. 
It found no better way to achieve that than through an alliance with Syria for the liberation of Kuwait. Syria's late president Hafez al-Assad sent his army to the Arabian desert, and in reward the US gave him a green light to bring the Aoun saga to an end. On the morning of October 13, 1990, the Syrian army launched a massive operation on Baabda Palace and areas of East Beirut controlled by Aoun. The defeated general fled to the French Embassy in Beirut then moved to Paris, where president Francois Mitterrand gave him political asylum. 

Aoun remained in exile during the 1990s, when Hariri ruled Beirut, along with the Syrian-backed president Elias Hrawi and Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament. It was these Lebanese leaders who prevented his return to Lebanon because they feared his wrath for having obediently worked with Syria for so long. Hariri was killed on February 14, 2005, and after Aoun’s return three months later, he refused to attribute his comeback to the murder of Hariri, but rather to his 14-year crusade from Paris. 
The new Aoun was older, wiser and angrier than ever before. He wanted to take revenge on all who had wronged him since 1990. There was no sense in taking revenge on the Syrians, he argued, since they had left Lebanon. He instead focused his anger on March 14 leaders like Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora, and Walid Jumblatt, the current leader of the Druze community. 
He failed to become president in 2007, but the March 14 coalition said it would never accept him - for different reasons. Muslim politicians like Hariri and Siniora feared a strong Christian president like Aoun would overshadow their Sunni prime minister. The same applied to Jumblatt, and Gagegea, who saw himself - being the other Christian heavyweight - as the best candidate for the Lebanese presidency. 
To understand Aoun one must understand how faithful his supporters have been in backing him. When he wanted to fight the Syrians, they were anti-Syrian to the bone. When he wanted to ally himself with Hezbollah, they became strong supporters of what the general was telling them to do. They support anything he tells them. It's that simple. Such strict adherence to a political leader who is not leading a confessional group and one who is switching sides so very dramatically is rare even in a country like Lebanon. 
Aoun has no states supporting him or furnishing him with money, like Saad al-Hariri, the politician son of the assassinated premier, and Saudi Arabia, or Hasan Nasrallah and Iran. He does not hail from a traditional political family, like Maronite politician Suleiman Franjiyeh, Druze leader Jumblatt, or former Sunni prime minister Omar Karameh. With no state behind him, and no political family on his shoulders, it is remarkable that the general has survived so long in the patron-client system of the Middle East. 
He is now bracing himself for the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2009, which he plans on tackling with Hezbollah. Aoun realizes that he cannot rule Lebanon without them. For their part, Hezbollah leaders realize that they need someone like Aoun to legitimize the "arms of the resistance" among Lebanese Christians. Nasrallah is popular with Christians of south Lebanon but until Aoun came along in 2005, there were Christians in Mount Lebanon who frowned on his military tactics - especially after the liberation of South Lebanon in 2000 - claiming that Lebanon was being made to pay the price for Hezbollah’s war with Israel. 
Depending on who you talk to in Lebanon, Christians are either still enchanted with "the general" or have began to hate him, because of his alliance with Hezbollah and his latest cozying up with Iran and Syria. Shortly before his Damascus visit, Aoun landed in Tehran to meet with Iranian leaders - sending a strong message to Saudi Arabia, which supports March 14. A pragmatic man, he knows that all is fair in love and war; and all is justified in his quest to become president of Lebanon. 

Michael Young From Daily Star

Michel Aoun's minority package tour

Daily Star

04/12/2008

You have to hand it to Michel Aoun, he never goes half-way. Here was everyone else staying in Syria for a few hours, two days at the most, and here is Aoun opting for the full four-night, five-day holiday package tour, including visits to religious sites, open buffets, Damascus by night, and an audience with the dictator, all for the low price of his mortal soul. 

There will be much dispute over Aoun's choices as he "reconciles" with his old Syrian enemy - his partisans applauding the general, his adversaries finding fault. But a more obvious question is what does Aoun gain from this trip that he didn't have before embarking on the road to Damascus? And what does he lose? - assuming that many Lebanese, perhaps most, still believe that Syria was behind the killing of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, as well as of dozens of others beginning in 2005. 

To the first question, the easy explanation, an electoral one, is unconvincing on its own. If Aoun's gambit is that he has to become friendly with Syria to be assured that his candidates will be given more room on electoral lists in predominantly Shiite constituencies, as well as Jezzine, then he has already forfeited enough politically to achieve that. Rather, the general's deeper ambition (if "depth" can in any way reasonably be applied here) is to become the primary mediator between the Christians and Syria's regime. Aoun's immediate aim is to displace President Michel Sleiman from that role, but more generally to breathe life into a contentious notion associated with his principal Maronite political ally, Suleiman Franjieh, but also with Aoun's own son-in-law, Gebran Bassil: namely that Christians, in order to protect their community, have a long-term advantage in entering into a strategic regional alliance of minorities with the Shiites and Syria's ruling Alawites. 

If there are any doubts about this, the symbolism of Aoun's visit is there to dispel them. The point of the general's planed excursions to Christian shrines in Damascus is to show that Christians thrive under Bashar Assad. 

To the second question - what does Aoun have to lose by so flamboyantly settling his differences with a regime accused of systematic murder in the past three years? - the answer is: quite a lot. Through this gesture, the general has taken his followers farther than ever in their divorce from the Lebanese sectarian consensus. Aoun has repeatedly sold his alliance with Hizbullah as a successful effort to preserve that consensus following the 2005 Independence Intifada. That would only be true had Aoun remained a bridge between Sunnis and Shiites. Instead he took sides, and is now thumbing his nose at the Sunni community once more by effectively absolving the Syrian regime of guilt in the Hariri murder; or worse, making it plain that he cares little about that guilt. 

But it's the Christians who will ultimately have the most forceful say on Aoun's Damascus trip. And whichever way you cut it, most Christians do not share the general's views on an alliance of minorities, nor are they particularly eager to embrace the Assad regime, preferring a colder relationship of mutual respect. Aoun is under the impression that he can continue to manipulate Christian misgivings about the Sunnis to his advantage. However, those misgivings only have meaning in the context of domestic Lebanese affairs. Once the Christians see the general wanting to take the community into a regional confrontation with the Sunni Arab world, once they realize that Aoun's method for doing so is a partnership with a deeply mistrusted Syrian leadership and with Iran, their reaction will likely be one of suspicion, if only from a perspective of self-interest. 


Self-interest counts for a lot, but there is also the matter of principle. It sends a very different message when Lebanese officials, mandated by the government, meet with their Syrian counterparts, and when a parliamentarian like Michel Aoun does so. That's not to say that Aoun had no right to visit Damascus, only that by doing so outside the confines of formal state-to-state relations - the desirable framework for ties between Lebanon and Syria - he injects a form of unilateralism into his act that demonstrates he will ignore Syrian behavior in Lebanon, regardless of how it violates Lebanese sovereignty and United Nations resolutions. That's why Aoun's defending his visit as representing a new page in Syrian-Lebanese relations is so manifestly vain. Aoun claims to be representing all of Lebanon when he only truly represents himself. 

Why should that matter? Because it would have been useful, just this once, for the Lebanese to be united around their victims. Aoun's political career since his return to Lebanon has centered on a perpetual struggle against the legacy of Rafik Hariri, whom the general never forgave for having, in death, served as a mobilizing force against the Syrian presence. By transforming his stay in Syria into a grand tour, part political summit, part pilgrimage, by offering so large a dispensation to Bashar Assad and demanding nothing in exchange (except for what Assad will toss him by way of making the trip more palatable in Lebanon), Aoun has betrayed the memory of even those who sided with him in his darker moments: the soldiers who died for him on October 13, 1990, after Aoun had fled to the French Embassy and refused to issue them with an order to surrender; Gebran Tueni, who had his differences with the general, but always defended Aoun's partisans when they were arrested and mistreated by the Lebanese security services; Samir Kassir, who had engaged Aounist students at St. Joseph University and encouraged them in their fight against Syrian hegemony; Antoine Ghanem and Pierre Gemayel, who had, like Aoun, endured years of marginalization at Syrian hands. 

Egoism is sometimes a quality of great men. Aoun would agree after placing himself at the same altitude as Charles de Gaulle reconciling France with Konrad Adenauer's West Germany. But his is an egoism without a trace of greatness, without vision or a center of gravity. Aoun took the package tour of Syria, the one the budget tourists choose. He won't come away from the experience with his reputation enhanced.

Elie Fayyad from L'Orient le Jour

En rire ou pas

L'orient le Jour

21/11/2008

Le général Michel Aoun comparant sa visite projetée en Syrie à celle de Charles de Gaulle dans l’Allemagne de l’après-guerre ? Voici ce qu’un lecteur nous écrit au sujet de cet improbable parallèle : « Quelqu’un de bien connu a dit qu’il faudrait rire au moins une fois par jour pour rester en bonne santé. Merci infiniment au général Aoun pour contribuer régulièrement à notre bien-être. » 
Il y en a qui en rient, il y en a qui en pleurent. Certains applaudissent et d’autres hurlent à la « mégalomanie ». D’aucuns font même de la surenchère : à leurs yeux, de Gaulle n’est pas à la hauteur, c’est à Jules César qu’il faut remonter pour trouver matière à comparaison. Pendant qu’en face, on évoque une fable de La Fontaine où il est question d’une grenouille et d’un bœuf. 
Dans un registre moins excessif, plus argumenté, certains lecteurs s’interrogent : de Gaulle s’était rendu dans une Allemagne vaincue et dénazifiée, une Allemagne où des troupes françaises étaient encore stationnées. À qui Michel Aoun rend-il visite ? Au pays des Assad ou à celui de Michel Kilo ? 
Une chose est sûre : au vu des réactions que ses diverses interventions suscitent, le général Aoun ne laisse quasiment personne indifférent. Rares sont les hommes politiques qui suscitent autant d’éloges dithyrambiques que de sarcasmes au vitriol. 
Et cette tendance est précisément en plein essor en cette phase préélectorale, dans laquelle le chef du CPL se retrouve en permanence au centre de l’actualité. La raison en est bien simple : ses alliés ne pouvant faire, électoralement parlant, davantage que leur plein – déjà atteint –, c’est son score à lui, et à lui seul, qui déterminera la victoire ou la défaite du projet politique du Hezbollah aux prochaines législatives. 
Car le doute n’est plus permis : l’énigmatique troisième voie, que le général affirmait vouloir rechercher aux débuts de l’actuelle législature, est déjà très lointaine. Par choix ou par contrainte, le CPL s’est laissé glisser lentement mais sûrement dans le sillage du parti de Dieu jusqu’à en épouser souvent les vues et la rhétorique. 
Or cette évolution ne s’est pas faite sans reniements successifs, le plus lourd de conséquences n’étant peut-être pas la visite programmée en Syrie, mais plutôt le document du général Aoun sur la stratégie défensive. 
Laissons de côté la vision martiale (et spartiate) de la société et du pays que développe le général dans ce texte. Elle fait déjà l’objet d’une littérature, pour ou contre, de plus en plus approfondie et volumineuse. Après tout, c’est sa conception, et elle est partagée par de nombreux Libanais. Même si elle relève d’un volontarisme qui heurte les sentiments de nombreux autres Libanais dans ce qu’elle comporte de relents totalitaires. 
Attardons-nous simplement sur un passage qui témoigne de l’ampleur des reniements opérés et qui dit combien Michel Aoun n’est plus lui-même : « (…) La tentative d’Israël de désarmer la Résistance afin de contrôler le pouvoir de décision libanais et, partant, d’imposer ses solutions dans le contentieux avec le Liban et les Palestiniens. Il est aidé en cela par la communauté internationale qui s’emploie à mettre en œuvre de manière sélective les résolutions (du Conseil de sécurité) en insistant sur l’application des textes récents et en ignorant les anciens (…). » 
Ne parlons pas de l’époque où il vantait sa contribution personnelle à l’une de ces résolutions récentes (la 1559), ni de celle où, fraîchement élu à la Chambre, il ouvrait le premier le feu sur l’arsenal du Hezbollah, alors que certains piliers du 14 Mars en étaient encore à quêter piteusement les impossibles fruits de la désastreuse « alliance quadripartite ». 
« La tentative d’Israël de désarmer la Résistance (…) » : ainsi, le général partage aujourd’hui le mépris du Hezbollah pour tous les Libanais hostiles à son arsenal. Ils n’existent tout simplement pas ! Pis encore : ils sont sous-entendus dans le mot « Israël » ! 
Voilà bien le genre de déclarations qui sied à une table de « dialogue » ! 
Mais il y a plus grave encore : de tout temps, le Liban officiel, et en particulier le général Aoun, s’est accroché aux résolutions onusiennes concernant ce pays comme à une planche de salut afin de fuir la trappe que constituent pour lui les textes plus globaux relatifs au Proche-Orient. Les premiers étaient perçus comme raffermissant son indépendance, son immunité intérieure, alors que les seconds le consacraient dans le rôle de théâtre de règlements de comptes régionaux. On se souvient d’ailleurs du combat mené par le général et ses partisans pour faire prévaloir la résolution 520. Tout comme on se souvient des efforts permanents de la Syrie – ils se poursuivent à l’heure actuelle – pour contrer les résolutions « libanaises ». 
De tout temps, le Liban officiel s’est accroché à ces dernières… jusqu’à Émile Lahoud. Après le retrait israélien du Liban-Sud, en 2000, ce président fut véritablement le premier à inverser la donne, à jouer la carte du maintien du Liban dans la sphère de jeu de l’axe syro-iranien. 
Il y a quelque temps, il a été écrit que le « aounisme » est devenu aujourd’hui la « phase ultime » du « lahoudisme ». Avec une énorme différence : Émile Lahoud ne draine pas les foules. Michel Aoun, si. 
Or justement, au vu de l’évolution de son discours politique, il y a un terrible contraste entre la stature apparente qu’a atteinte le général Aoun et le poids réel du rôle qu’il a à jouer. Les superlatifs – positifs ou négatifs – que l’on sort à tout bout de champ à son sujet finissent par dissimuler l’enjeu véritable qu’il représente aujourd’hui, celui d’un simple appoint. 
Certes, on a besoin de lui pour gagner les élections, mais c’est à peu près tout ce qu’on lui demande. Si l’opposition gagne, ce seront les options du Hezbollah qui seront au pouvoir, et si elle perd, c’est au général que la défaite sera forcément imputée, puisque les vraies batailles n’auront lieu que dans les circonscriptions chrétiennes. 
Derrière l’écran de fumée, se cache une réalité tangible : Hassan Nasrallah a réussi une gageure. Il recrute même en temps de paix.

Harry Hagopian From Newropeans

Lebanon: Torn between War & Peace!

16/10/2008

Newropeans

Harry Hagopian

It was not so very long ago that the majority of the Lebanese people celebrated joyfully the brokering of the Doha Agreement that promised to put an end to the interminable chapters of political and physical violence. 

One of the more unusual ways in which they tasted this hopeful sense of coming together was the introduction by Häagen Daz of the ‘Doha Agreement Ice Cream Cone’. For just LL 10,400, the Lebanese could buy a cone that was the result of a joint venture between the American ice cream giant in Lebanon and Qatar Airways. The promotion was expected to last so long as the mood in the country remained one of reconciliation - or at least until the politicians “started fighting again.” 

However, I did not see those cones being sold at any of the outlets when I visited Beirut recently. Did I not look hard enough, or was it likely due to the fact that reconciliation had weakened as a marketable currency in the country? 

Over the past three months, much has happened in Lebanon. The Lebanese got a new president at long last, and a national unity cabinet was put together that also amended the previous electoral law of 1960. Mind you, it did not grant Lebanese expatriates the right to vote in the next parliamentary elections, nor did it lower the voting age from 21 to 18 although the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines anyone over 18 as an adult. Moreover, Presidents Assad and Suleiman also importantly agreed - at least in principle - to establish formal diplomatic relations, with Damascus and Beirut opening embassies in their respective countries for the first time in 64 years since independence from French mandate. 

But in addition to those developments relating to the Doha Agreement, and even though ice cream cones are not easy to find in the market, there are a few hopeful efforts at reconciliation underway, all the way from the national all-factions dialogue under the aegis of the president, to the parallel efforts aimed at bridging the yawning gaps between bickering Christian political parties to the one-on-one meetings of bellicose political leaders such as those of Al-Mustaqbal and Hizbullah. 

Yet, whilst all those sanguine efforts are trying to contribute toward the stabilisation of the country, tensions remain quite dangerously high. There are murderous attacks and inter-confessional spurts of violence occurring for instance across the northern town of Tripoli that is largely a Sunni bastion. An oft-quoted example is the recurrent violence between the Baal Mohsen district (that is pro-opposition) and Bab al Tabbaneh neighbourhood (that is pro-majority). There have also been bloody attacks against Lebanese soldiers as well as civilians on buses or in streets. Those examples exacerbate the fears of many Lebanese that darker clouds could easily re-appear on the horizon again After all, Tripoli is geographically close to Syria, and some pundits harbour the suspicion that an unsettled Tripoli could be used by Syria as justification to extend its influence over Lebanon or even send its army back into the country. Indeed, it is no mere detail that the highest-ranking Salafi Authority in Lebanon, Dai al-Islam Shahhal, warned against an incursion by the Syrian Army into north Lebanon saying it would open "the gates of hell and lead to what is similar to Iraq and its misery." 

Meanwhile, in the midst of this ominous rumble of developments, the issue of the arms in possession of Hizbullah is also casting a dark shadow over any genuine reconciliation. Given that one man’s meat is another’s poison, literally half the Lebanese population consider that Hizbullah should disarm with its weapons coming under the control of the Lebanese army. The other half believes that they should stay with Hizbullah and its Shi’i Amal allies since they would be used in resisting Israeli aggression and occupation. And the major - though not exclusive - justification for resistance by those factions insisting on keeping their arms is that Israel detains the Shaba’a Farms as well as the Lebanese part of the village of Ghajar (with recent reports that Israel might return it to Lebanon next month) and Kfar Shouba hills that were meant to be returned to Lebanon - either directly or through an initial UN trusteeship - also in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1701. 

But what are those Shaba’a Farms anyway? 

The tiny sliver of lush land 25 square kilometres across is located at the junction of southeast Lebanon, southwest Syria and northern Israel. Israel seized those Farms from Syria in 1967 when it occupied the nearby Golan Heights. Ever since then, those Farms have been caught in a tug-of-war over ownership. Lebanon claims them, with the backing of Damascus, while Israel insists they are part of Syria. 

The confusion over the borders actually dates back to 1923 when Britain and France, who held the mandates of the League of Nations over the territories now comprising Israel, Lebanon and Syria, failed to outline their borders clearly. Lebanon has accused Israel of refusing to return the Farms in order to benefit from the bountiful natural resources of the region, particularly its water resources. According to officials, the Farms hold 23 natural water sources and also strategic or military importance due to their altitude. 

When UNSC Resolution 1701 brought an end to the 33-day war between Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006, it called upon the UN secretary-general to propose a border demarcation for those Farms. The UN ruled that the withdrawal from Lebanon was complete and that the Farms were Syrian. 

Nevertheless, in March 2008, the Lebanese geographer Issam Khalifeh published a book full of documents claiming the Farms were indeed Lebanese, including a 1946 deal in which Damascus recognised Lebanon's sovereignty over the territory. Attached to the report was a map with 48 border markers, but Syria has refused to let this paperwork be sent to the UN, perhaps because it did not wish to go down road of recognition and delineation of an international border. 

All these are issues that are clearly weighing upon the Lebanese mindset, and in the process retarding any progress from a state of brittle uncertainty to one of relative stability. However, what is also clear to me is that the major objective of all the parties above all else are the parliamentary elections of spring of 2009 that might well decide which parties enjoy the majority of votes - and therefore of seats and of power. So whilst there is a government in place for running day-to-day affairs, everyone understands that the political focus today revolves truly around those elections. 

But here is another hitch! In some sense, it is almost predictable what percentages, districts and seats the Sunni, Shi’i and Druze candidates would get in the parliamentary elections next year. The real guesstimate is the future number of Christian seats that will be obtained by the different Christian coalitions since their future is very much in play now - particularly given their divisions in an almost irredeemable - roughly 50:50 - ratio. Only last week, the Maronite patriarch, HE Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir, expressed the hope that Christians would respond to the initiatives of the Maronite League and “would sit together because other sects have achieved reconciliation”, adding that “agreement among all the Lebanese is impossible.” 

A straw poll conducted by Now Lebanon explored the reason hampering inter-Christian reconciliation. The results revealed that 38% thought it was due to electoral interests and the requirements of electoral mobilisation, whilst 14% thought that it was due to a lack of serious efforts to respond favourably to reconciliation endeavours, and a large percentage of 49% attributed it to lingering personal feuds among Christian leaders. 

Those polls notwithstanding, I am convinced that the Lebanese Christians could play a central role in the forthcoming elections and that in the process would also hold the balance of power between the other political parties so they could then perhaps advance those community demands that have been ignored for long. Broadly put, there are now two competing Christian camps. On one side, Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Amin Gemayel’s Phalanges are still struggling for an end of Syrian influence and attempting to mobilise support for the need to restore a fully sovereign Lebanese state. They would claim to pursue this strategic choice by pressing Hizbullah to disarm and also by setting up an international tribunal charged with investigating Rafiq Hariri’s murder. On the other side of the Christian political divide, General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement has challenged the inert political system as a whole and broken its isolation by forging a controversial “understanding” with Hizbullah and by allying himself indirectly with the Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh. 
The divisions between the two Christian camps are fundamental and stretch back decades in some instances. Today, the leadership of this community is at stake. General Michel Aoun wants to be that undisputed leader, which is why he is attacking the other leaders relentlessly, undermining the role of the Maronite patriarch and even sniping at the president. However, his position is becoming increasingly untenable. He is gradually losing the support of key allies in the form of the Metn leader Michel Murr and of the Armenian Tashnaq party, and as a consequence is trying to compensate his losses in Mount Lebanon by winning over some areas in the South (that he visited recently), as well as in Ba’albek and Hermel. 
A third option to this bipolar configuration still remains unclear. What are President Michel Suleiman’s own plans? In his inaugural speech, he emphasised demands and concerns that are significant to the Christian community in Lebanon. Other than rejecting the naturalisation of the Palestinians and facilitating the return of the displaced, he highlighted administrative reform, decentralisation, empowering the presidency and ensuring better Christian representation in high-ranking civil positions. If he were to field his own parliamentary list, or support such a list, it would weaken Aoun considerably and lead toward the re-formation of the Christian camp. In fact, with his stewardship of intra-Christian reconciliation, the President holds a few cards and his influence could grow considerably and make significant differences in the forthcoming elections. 
In fact, what is remarkable to me is that Christians and Muslims are seemingly reconciling more easily in Lebanon than the Christians themselves - a fact that not only underlines the virile tussle for power and control, but also that their continued bickering would run the risk of leading even further to their gradual erosion. After all, the political landscape keeps changing with the almost cyclical re-balancing of outside powers that are playing the Lebanese card of pitting the Lebanese against each other. In fact, the recent difficult hopes for conciliatory moves between the Lebanese Forces and Marada can only benefit the whole country politically even thought there is a lot of bloody history between both sides. 

I am being cautiously optimistic that things will not change too dramatically in the country this side of the 2009 parliamentary spring elections. Barring any major eruptions of terror and mayhem, and with the parties using their networks to consolidate their own positions, I would argue that Syria is also waiting for the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections to see what leverage it will have internally. While internationally, it is also awaiting the results of the US presidential elections, as it knows that the US alone can determine Syria’s position as a regional player, its role in Lebanon, the advancement of its negotiations with Israel, and of course, its position vis-à-vis the international tribunal. I also suspect that Syria will probably make no concrete moves for now on diplomatic relations, and on most sensitive issues, including border demarcation, the Shaba’a Farms and Lebanese detainees. But one key concern for me is the fact that Iran might still prove to be the wild card that would interfere and upset the political applecart. 

Ever since 11 November 2006, when a number of ministers resigned from the cabinet, Lebanon has witnessed assassinations, demonstrations, sit-ins, internal and external threats, a temporary military takeover of west Beirut, exacerbated tensions in the north of the country, attempts at re-enforcing the mechanisms of government and many internecine feuds that have been followed by attempts at dialogue and reconciliation. So what is all this doing to the whole country? 

Lebanon is simply being weakened in major dribs and minor drabs, cleaving parts of the country from each other whereby different politicians claim to work for the one nation but pledge their allegiances to their own factions. Confessionalism, always a Lebanese misfortune, is increasingly overwhelming the political apparatuses, and in the process widening the chasm between different politicians and the ordinary people and altering facts on the ground. My constant dread is that a combination of internal divergences and external threats would lead to new rounds of bloody fighting. 

After all, has this not happened before? It often saddens me that Lebanese politicians are so gifted in splitting hair and believing in the absolute truths of their own arguments let alone those of their regional or international supporters that they act as clan leaders rather than global politicians and in so doing turn deaf ears to a vox populi that aspires for peace, coexistence and harmony in the country. A divisive blend of religious myopia, political self-interest and nefarious outside interferences from all sides are together rending the country apart and stymieing the creative gifts of a people that talks about the oneness of Lebanon but ends up shaking that oneness at the seams. Does anyone pause to think of the whole picture? 

Last week, following an agreement between Al-Moustaqbal and Hizbullah parties, the Lebanese have taken down the provocative posters. This is a move in the right direction, but will it augment the chances for peace? Or is it simply that the Lebanese sagas will continue until such time as there is a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement? Has Lebanon lost all control over its own geopolitics and is now a fallible pawn on the chessboard of international politics? The Arab World (no matter how one defines this amorphous term) is too divided in its interests to buttress up Lebanon, and the West is too greedy to care much about it either. So this small country is paying the price of international politics and local power plays. 

Given such realities on the ground, is it surprising that the song Khalas (Enough) by the Lebanese musician and singer Nicholas Sa'adeh Nakhleh has become a chart-topper? After all, ordinary people are saying khalas, and I suspect they will also rally round his next song Unity once it comes out since it too will speak volubly to the majority of Lebanese instincts. 

Torn between war and peace for so long, will Lebanon finally find peace? More to the point, will it be allowed to find it?

Michel Touma from L'Orient le Jour

PERSPECTIVE - Entre libanisation et hezbollahisation

L'Orient le Jour
01/09/2008

Lorsque le Courant patriotique libre a signé le 6 février 2006 le « document d’entente » avec le Hezbollah, il a tenu à préciser avec insistance, dans un premier temps, qu’il ne s’agissait là nullement d’une alliance entre les deux formations, mais plutôt d’une sorte de déclaration de principes commune. Et pour faire avaler à l’opinion publique la couleuvre de cette démarche politiquement contre nature, certains cadres du CPL entretenaient l’illusion selon laquelle l’objectif recherché était de stimuler une « libanisation » du Hezbollah, reconnaissant ainsi implicitement l’existence d’un problème sur ce plan. Trop contents de bénéficier ainsi d’une couverture chrétienne inespérée, les dirigeants du parti pro-iranien ont rapidement qualifié leur nouvelle relation d’alliance stratégique, n’hésitant pas à mettre sur le devant de la scène le général Michel Aoun à chaque fois qu’une position tactique quelque peu délicate devait être prise par le 8 Mars.
Emporté par la dynamique implacable enclenchée le 6 février 2006, le chef du CPL n’a pas tardé à placer ses liens avec le Hezbollah sous le label d’« alliance éternelle ». Et la politique étant indubitablement la résultante d’un rapport de force, en guise de libanisation de la formation chiite, c’est plutôt à un étrange phénomène de hezbollahisation du CPL auquel nous avons assisté. La dernière en date des manifestations de cette hezbollahisation a été la réaction du courant aouniste à l’agression caractérisée perpétrée par les miliciens du Hezbollah contre un hélicoptère de l’armée dont le pilote a été abattu. Alors que, à titre d’exemple, l’ancien Premier ministre Sélim Hoss, connu pour ses positions mitigées et prudentes, a adopté une attitude très ferme au sujet de cette attaque, le CPL a entrepris de publier un communiqué particulièrement laconique de quatre lignes, se contentant de déplorer l’incident et de réclamer timidement qu’une enquête soit menée par les autorités concernées, sans faire aucunement mention des circonstances du drame ou de ses auteurs.
Qu’un courant qui était jadis à l’avant-garde de la mouvance souverainiste en vienne à banaliser de cette façon une agression aussi grave que celle de Sejoud, cela ne peut avoir qu’une seule explication, à savoir que ce courant est devenu l’otage, essentiellement électoral, du Hezbollah. D’autant que son chef était commandant de l’armée et que son leitmotiv était précisément la prééminence de l’État et de l’armée face à toute milice ou faction cherchant à imposer un mini-État de fait accompli dans le pays. Un tel leitmotiv n’était-il pas d’ailleurs le prétexte brandi haut et fort (surtout avec force) pour justifier les deux batailles successives menées en 1989 et 1990 ? Un leader a, certes, le droit de changer de comportement. Mais en général, il est préférable que cela se fasse dans la bonne direction et non pas à contre-courant de l’histoire…
Il reste que bien au-delà de telles considérations d’opportunismes politiques et de calculs politiciens, l’affaire de l’hélicoptère a mis en évidence, d’une manière dramatique, le caractère chimérique du principe prôné désormais ouvertement par le général Aoun, portant sur la « complémentarité » entre l’armée et la « Résistance » (en l’occurrence le Hezbollah). Car, comme le soulignait hier en substance l’ancien député Salah Honein dans une interview à La Voix du Liban, il ne saurait y avoir de complémentarité entre une thèse et son antithèse, entre deux forces armées ayant chacune son propre projet politique, pas nécessairement convergent avec l’autre.
Dans des cas extrêmes, une coordination bien huilée pourrait être, à la rigueur, envisageable entre des troupes gouvernementales et une forme de résistance populaire, mais à la condition que la décision de guerre et de paix soit du seul ressort de l’autorité centrale, que la chambre d’opérations militaires relève uniquement de l’armée régulière et que – plus important encore – la résistance en question soit celle de toutes les composantes nationales, et non pas celle d’un seul et unique parti. Surtout lorsque ce parti s’obstine à refuser que quiconque puisse ne fût-ce que discuter du « droit » qu’il s’est lui-même arrogé, par la force des armes, de monopoliser tout acte de résistance. Et de surcroît, cette complémentarité défendue par le général Aoun constitue une véritable insulte à l’intelligence des Libanais du fait que, de par son financement, ses racines, sa structure, son idéologie, la source de son armement, le soutien logistique, politique et matériel qu’il reçoit, le Hezbollah est organiquement tributaire, dans ses grandes décisions politiques, d’un mentor régional qui ne cache pas sa volonté de transformer le Liban en un terrain d’affrontements avec ses divers adversaires géopolitiques, occidentaux ou arabes.
L’agression de Sejoud a ainsi illustré, dans le sang, à quel point il est illusoire de concilier la logique de l’État central, rassembleur, avec celle d’un parti armé, motivé dans son comportement, et, depuis des décennies, par un projet supranational et une raison d’État étrangère. Le lieutenant Samer Hanna aura payé de sa vie cet antagonisme incontournable entre les impératifs d’une armée nationale, seule garante de la souveraineté, et la logique, conditionnée par des paramètres régionaux, d’une faction paraétatique qui s’emploie, pas à pas, progressivement, lentement, de façon pernicieuse, à accroître l’étendue des lignes rouges et des contraintes qu’elle cherche à imposer à l’État. Car irrémédiablement, le champ de son influence ne peut être qu’inversement proportionnel à celui du pouvoir central.

Michel Touma

Jean Issa from L'Orient le Jour

L’albinos et l’albatros

L'orient le Jour
22/08/2008

Tirée de mots croisés comme le fer par Tristan, une définition œnologique de l’albinos : blanc de blanc. Qui n’y voit goutte, et goûte à l’ivresse de se croire lui-même invisible. Comme l’autruche en son sable, et l’on se demande, perplexe, où elle peut bien en trouver à Sydney (Chaplin). Du côté de nos chapelains patelins du coin-coin CPL, bien mauvaise vue itou. 

Car il y a, dans la nomenclature officielle qu’ils prétendent réviser dans leurs devoirs de vacances, une vacance, un blanc qui saute aux yeux de tout lynx bien constitué, constitutionnellement. Ques aco ? Tout simplement, tout bêtement, l’inventaire de gradation suivant : numéro un, le président de la République ; numéro deux, le président de l’Assemblée nationale ; numéro trois, le président du Conseil ; numéro cinq, le vice-président de la Chambre ; numéro six (ou six bis, selon la parité Taëf), le vice-Premier ministre. 

Et le numéro quatre ? C’est comme le Cinzano mauve, ça n’existe pas. Chez nous, en effet, il n’y a pas de vice-président de la République. Par la vertu d’un vice de forme, et même de haut-de-forme. 

Et c’est autant de gagné, une solde d’épargnée pour nos popoches de contribuables ultrapressurés. Car un vice quelque chose, quand ça ne supplée pas en cas d’absence du titulaire, ou quand ça n’est pas chargé d’une vague mission humanitaire, voire honoraire-protocolaire comme représenter la Maison-Blanche à un mariage de jazzman à Maison Rouge, ça ne sert strictement à rien. À preuve qu’à Washington DC, une blague connue dit que la seule occupation-préoccupation du vice-président est d’aller demander, chaque matin, comment va le président. 
Mais tant que brèche il y a, pourquoi ne pas s’y engouffrer. Trois jeunes tambours… Après tout, ils étaient trois en 89. Un maronite, un grec-orthodoxe et un grec-catholique. Que devient l’étoile du troisième mirlitaire comme persiflait Allais ? On pourrait la redorer en exigeant pour lui, et pour la logique de la numérotation, qu’il se voie attribuer la vice-présidence de la République. 

D’autant que s’il est juste que les grecs-orthodoxes, quatrième communauté, ont droit à une gâterie supplémentaire (encore que la vice-présidence de la Chambre, hein-hein), il est injuste que les grecs-catholiques, qui viennent juste après, n’aient aucune, mais alors là aucune, part du gâteau. Certes, cela nécessiterait une révision de la Constitution. Mais bien d’autres exigences des prosyriens aussi, le CPL le sait-il. 
Et puis, et enfin, comment voulez-vous que l’albatros aounien prenne son envol, vers la colline inspirée de Barrès et de Baabda, sans ces deux ailes que Saëb Salam chantait jadis à tue-tête. Du temps où lutter pour la participation avait un sens politico-national, et pas du tout perso-lucrativo-électoral.

Michael Young from Daily Star

The battle of the two Michels has begun

Daily Star
21/08/2008

Weeks ago, Michel Aoun's political adversaries were already predicting that the general's first act once the government was formed would be to demand that the prerogatives of the deputy prime minister be clarified. The post is traditionally "reserved" for the Greek Orthodox community and is currently held by Aoun's comrade Issam Abu Jamra. They sensed that Aoun would use the dispute to yet again try to rally support among Christians by claiming to be defending their interests against Sunni dominance - since the deputy prime minister's job description must necessarily be elucidated at the expense of the Sunni prime minister.

On Tuesday, this discussion took on more rarefied airs when the minister Tammam Salam and the parliamentarian Ghassan Mukheiber of the Aoun bloc exchanged statements on the role of Mukheiber's uncle, Albert, when he was deputy prime minister in the 1972 government headed by Tammam Salam's father, Saeb. Mukheiber argued that his uncle had stood in for Salam when the prime minister was abroad, while Salam insisted this was not true. Mukheiber went on to state that now was a good time to define the duties of the deputy prime minister, which must have pleased Aoun while also allowing Mukheiber to score some points within his own Greek Orthodox community. 
In the midst of a hot summer, this somehow qualifies as news. Aoun has long been a master of institutional guerilla warfare, in which he scores points by consistently applying sectarian pin pricks. However, something may be changing. The small-mindedness of the deputy prime minister debate may actually play to Aoun's disfavor because it comes as the president, Michel Sleiman, is seen by many to be filling his political space with more momentous achievements - not least his visit to Damascus last week. In the competition over Christian representation, Aoun's weapons are now looking less effective than Sleiman's. 
A lot of this is based on perceptions, of course. Sleiman came back triumphant from Syria, but the results of his summit with President Bashar Assad were, to be kind, very limited. On the fate of prisoners in Syria the Lebanese got a committee with no deadlines set for its work. On border demarcation Lebanon got another committee, again with no deadlines set, with many people apparently unaware that the demarcation question has been drifting from one committee to the next for decades. On the Shebaa Farms the Lebanese adopted the Syrian position that there could be no delineation of borders before Israel's occupation ended, thereby leaving the geographical identity of the territory in limbo. And before traveling to Damascus, Sleiman, through a spokesman, declared that the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, the starkest memento of the years of Syrian hegemony, would not be dismantled. 

What did Lebanon get in exchange? The promise of an embassy and diplomatic recognition. That's not negligible, but we might want to look at this from Syria's perspective. A Syrian embassy in Beirut would not be like the Kuwaiti or even the Egyptian embassy. It would be an axis point for Syria's allies in the country, a very useful means of allowing the Assad regime to exert its political influence in Beirut on a day-to-day basis in a way it cannot do so today. Many remember the considerable sway that the United Arab Republic's ambassador in Beirut, Abdel-Hamid Ghaleb, had at the start of President Fouad Shihab's mandate. Diplomatic recognition on its own does not guarantee respect for Lebanese sovereignty. 


Despite all this, Sleiman benefited domestically from his summit with Assad, and came back to take in hand the volatile situation in Tripoli. The public could not but approve, whatever the results, and Aoun is beginning to realize that he is losing ground among his coreligionists. Nor can the general gain much anymore by persistently baiting Fouad Siniora, when the prime minister seems to be working so well with president. This was evident in the preparation for Siniora's trips to Egypt and Iraq, both partly designed to help overcome the electricity crisis. Aoun's frustration was understandable. Siniora, with Sleiman's tacit approval, circumvented the energy minister, Alain Tabourian, whose Tashnag Party is allied with the Aounist bloc. The president and prime minister, each for reasons of his own, are happy to collude against Aoun. Better still, they are playing on the recent tension between the general and Tashnag over the fact that Aoun gave them the Energy Ministry in his quota of ministerial portfolios, when they had asked for the social affairs portfolio that Aoun instead reserved for Mario Aoun, a member of the Free Patriotic Movement. 

It may be a reach to suggest that Sleiman is making a bid for the Armenians at this early stage, by showing them that they have more to gain by allying themselves with him than with Aoun. But ultimately that may be precisely what the president does as Michel Murr begins preparing a candidate list in the Metn, one facet of a broader strategy by Sleiman to nibble away at Aoun's base before parliamentary elections next year. It is known that the president wants a bloc of his own in Parliament, and he may be able to count on assistance from Aoun's rivals in this regard. That explains why Aoun has so fervently defended Hizbullah lately. He needs Shiite help to win compensatory seats in the Baabda constituency, in Jezzine, and in Zahleh. Some are suggesting Aoun also has an eye on the Maronite seat in Baalbek-Hermel.  
The elections are still a long way off, but Aoun is already entering the period he dreaded after he was forced in Doha to accept Sleiman's election. For better or worse the president is now the person most Maronites and Christians in general are looking toward to defend their communal wellbeing. This is forcing Aoun to behave recklessly, as when he tied Hizbullah's disarmament to the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes, a position that made many in his electorate gag. Aoun also erred in appointing his son-in-law to head the cash cow Ministry of Telecommunications, contradicting his earlier claims to be a different type of politician who opposed nepotism in politics.  

Aoun is a cat of many political lives, so it may be unwise to write him off just yet. But even cats need branches to sit on, and the general is finding that these are not as numerous as they once were. He is picking secondary fights and is now beginning to sound like a lost voice in the desert.

Emile Khoury from L'Orient Le Jour

L’arsenal et l’appétit du Hezbollah font trembler le Liban politique

L'Orient le Jour - Émile KHOURY
02-08-2008

Le fusil qui parle. Et qui est même très loquace. Quoi de plus éloquent, de plus clair, de plus net, de plus précis que le langage musclé du Hezbollah. Un discours, mieux que menaçant, décisionnaire. Au point que l’on se surprend à sourire de la naïveté qu’il y a eu à perdre du temps sur la déclaration ministérielle. Quoi qu’en dise le texte, le parti n’en fera qu’à sa tête en faisant donner corps à ce qu’il veut et en torpillant ce qui ne lui convient pas. Par tous les moyens, en commençant au besoin par les armes, pour faire court et pour soumettre l’État à sa volonté, en attendant de se l’approprier. Sinon en totalité, du moins en légataire principal d’un indivis avec les intrus traditionnels que l’on sait, et leurs bons amis du cru.
Des députés loyalistes rappellent qu’au lendemain de la guerre de juillet 2006, alors que le Hezb criait à la victoire divine pour avoir pu éviter l’élimination, Assad n’avait pas hésité à déclarer que le pouvoir devait revenir, au Liban, à ce vainqueur. En base de l’équation, sans doute héritée du passé éliminateur de son propre père, qui veut que celui qui l’emporte sur le terrain ait le droit de régner. Un point de vue militarisé, quasi dictatorial, approuvé de suite alors par le général Michel Aoun en sa qualité d’allié indéfectible du triomphateur.

Torpillage
Les circonstances régionales et internationales ne lui permettant pas de renverser la table, et le pouvoir, le Hezb a donc entrepris de le paralyser. En retirant ses ministres du gouvernement, en lançant le sit-in des tentes, en multipliant les provocations et les troubles de rue, en organisant des manifestations et des grèves, en poussant Berry à fermer le Parlement. Puis en bloquant la présidentielle pendant six mois. Toujours sous la menace de son armement qu’il a d’ailleurs fini par utiliser en mai pour envahir Beyrouth-Ouest et attaquer la Montagne.
Pendant tout ce temps, le président Siniora et la majorité ont su tenir bon. En résistant, malgré leur bon droit, à la tentation de faire remplacer les ministres démissionnaires, pour ne pas inciter le Hezb à une rébellion armée qui aurait fait sauter le pays. Et en faisant d’importantes concessions apparentes, qui étaient en réalité autant de pièges qu’en face on ne pouvait éviter. Comme de présenter la candidature du général Sleiman, en retirant de la course les candidats du 14 Mars. Comme de consentir, à Doha, à la loi électorale de 1960. Ou comme d’octroyer aux prosyriens le fameux tiers de blocage. En se contentant, qui plus est, d’un portefeuille régalien contre deux au président.
La Syrie y a trouvé matière à crier de nouveau victoire. En affirmant avoir elle-même inspiré, sinon fabriqué, l’accord de Doha, en faveur de ses fidèles du Liban. Là où elle a manifestement raison, c’est dans le fait que cet accord s’est trouvé tout de suite, à son profit, aussi tronqué et dévié que Taëf. Par exemple, en ce qui se rapporte à ses clauses ordonnant que seule règne l’autorité sécuritaire de l’État, sans recours aux armes nulle part sur le territoire, par qui que cela soit. La réponse ne s’est pas fait attendre : des agressions aux missiles contre des bastions loyalistes dans la Békaa, notamment à Taalabaya, à deux pas de la frontière syrienne.

Succession
Mais, à moins d’un improbable retournement total de la situation extérieure, il est exclu que Damas puisse rétablir sa tutelle directe sur le Liban. C’est donc le volet purement intérieur, articulé sur la volonté de domination du Hezbollah, qui marque l’actualité. L’épée de Damoclès de l’armement a servi pour imprimer, au bout de trois semaines, un sens déterminé à la déclaration ministérielle, au programme du gouvernement.
Le Hezbollah a exigé que l’on évoque, en bien et en soutien naturellement, la résistance qu’il prétend incarner. Donc son droit, tout aussi prétendu, de décider seul de la guerre, comme il l’a fait en juillet 2006, quand les bombardements de l’aviation, de l’artillerie terrestre, des chars et de la marine d’Israël se sont acharnés sur l’infrastructure nationale, les ponts, les chaussées, les centrales électriques, bien plus que sur les positions du Hezb, volatiles par définition de guérilla.
Encore une fois, mention spéciale pour Rabieh. C’est là que des responsables du Hezb, en visite, ont lancé des accusations de trahison contre tous ceux qui s’opposent à l’armement du parti, dirigé vers l’intérieur. Pour ajouter qu’il n’y a pas de Liban sans la résistance, et pas de déclaration ministérielle. Prenant les devants, leur hôte avait déclaré que « l’arsenal du Hezbollah est un armement de résistance dont le Liban ne peut se départir avant que ne soient réglés tous les problèmes relatifs à Israël, dont celui du retour des réfugiés palestiniens et du rejet de l’implantation ». Faisant fi de ses anciens principes, du temps de sa propre résistance à certain autre occupant, il consacre ainsi la pérennité de fait d’un armement irrégulier, au mépris de l’État souverain, libre, indépendant. Il lie en effet le désarmement à un règlement global irréalisable avant de longues années, voire des décennies. En foulant aux pieds le droit élémentaire du Liban de dissocier sa propre cause du conflit israélo-arabe, question palestinienne en tête.

Leçon d’histoire
Un droit tout à fait vital que le regretté président Élias Sarkis défendait à cor et à cri devant le monde entier, bien qu’il eût eu les pieds et les poings liés. Ainsi, la note libanaise à la conférence de paix de Madrid précisait clairement que « la participation du Liban ne signifie pas qu’il lie la solution de son problème au règlement du conflit régional. Car le Liban estime qu’il faut traiter sa question de manière séparée, en raison de son caractère d’urgence, de son effet destructeur sur ses structures politiques, économiques et sociales ». Autre homme d’État libanais, et bien qu’étant durant la guerre dans un camp différent, le regretté président Rachid Karamé a certifié cette même nécessité de dissociation dans son intervention à l’ONU, le 5 octobre 1984.
De plus, en quoi l’armement du Hezbollah peut-il influer sur la question de l’implantation ou du retour des réfugiés palestiniens ? On ne voit pas trop, d’autant que ce problème ne relève pas de la responsabilité du seul Liban, mais de celle de tous les pays arabes. Comme l’ont reconnu les résolutions du sommet arabe tenu à Beyrouth. Si les alliés de la Syrie veulent vraiment rejeter l’implantation, le meilleur moyen c’est encore de la prier de ne pas conclure d’accord avec Israël tant que le droit de retour n’aura pas été assuré.
Enfin, le général Michel Aoun souhaite-t-il maintenir son blanc-seing à un armement qui a été dirigé vers l’intérieur ? Veut-il que ce fusil commande Beyrouth puis le Liban tout entier ? Croit-il encore que l’arsenal est réservé à la libération, alors que l’armée et la Finul se sont déployées au Sud et que Chebaa va passer sous tutelle de transmission onusienne ?